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NOTES AND COMMENT
being." 27 Chief Justice Marshall concluded "that general words
must not only be limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the state,
but also to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply
them." 28 The decision in the case under consideration constitutes
legislation by the judiciary. "It is the function of the Court to
construe the statute and not to defeat it as construed." 29 "It is the
duty of all courts of justice," said Lord Chief Justice Wilmot, "to
keep their eye steadily upon the interest of the public, even in the
administration of commitative justice; and when they find an action
is founded upon a claim injurious to the public, and which has a bad
tendency, to give it no countenance or assistance in foro civili." 30
As the decision now stands, the purpose of the statute is lost. Is it
to be assumed that any man may now make a livelihood illegally?
Can he take his chance in winning and if successful retain his gains,
and in losing bring an action and recover the money he has lost?
This undoubtedly will stimulate gambling to the nth degree, for
under the law of the recent decision the bookmaker is unable even
to offset his losses.
It should not have been necessary to plead the illegality of this
contract which plainly appears on its face. If the plaintiff's action
is to be sustained, the defendant should have been allowed to offset
his losses against the plaintiff's. A disposition even more harmonious
with the intention of the Legislature would have been for the Court
to have, of its own motion, stepped in and denied the right to any
relief thereunder without reference to the state of the pleadings, since




WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-INCIDENTAL OCCUPATION.
The Workmen's Compensation Law,' in its far-reaching pater-
nalism, has opened a field of statutory law in which liberal construc-
'United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610 (U. S. 1820) (Chief Justice
Marshall in construing an act of Congress of April 30, 1790, §8 [1 Stat. 113]
relating to robbery on the high seas).
2 Ibid.
U 'United States v. Palmer, supra note 27; Sorrell v. United States, 287
U. 5. 435, 449, 450, 53 Sup. Ct. 210, 215 (1932).
Law v. Peers, Wilmot's Notes, 364, 378; approved in Veasey v. Allen,
173 N. Y. 359, 368, 66 N. E. 103 (1903).
' Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261, 26 L. Ed. 539 (1880) ; Raferts v.
Criss, 266 Fed. 296 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920); Drake v. Lawer, 93 App. Div. 86, 88,
86 N. Y. Supp. 986, aff'd, 182 N. Y. 533, 75 N. E. 1135 (4th Dept. 1905);
Drake v. Siebald, 81 Hun 178, 183 (N. Y. 1884).
'La.vs of 1913, c. 816; Amended and Re-enacted, Laws of 1914, c. 41;
Consolidated Laws, c. 67.
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tion of the statutory provisions by the courts, as regards the rights
and interests of employees, is practiced. Particularly significant, in
view of the antecedent common law principles of master and servant,
is the construction which the courts give to the phrase, "arising out
of and in the course of the employment." 2 In this connection, the
questions of fact and law pertaining to the determination of the in-
cidental or non-incidental character of work, occupations, conditions
and occurrences arising out of an employee's going to or coming from
the place of employment lead into a path beset with legal thorns. In
the recent case of Schwimmer v. Kamnmernn & Kaninsky,3 the
Court of Appeals has dealt with a phase of this problem in a manner
that serves as an excellent point of departure in analyzing the law
of New York concerning the status of employer and employee as
affected by the latter's travels to and from the place of employment.
The facts in this case show that the employee deviated from the
accustomed route from his home to the place of work to purchase,
at the direction of the employer, materials for the repair of a ma-
chine at which he worked. In so doing, and while resuming his
travels to the establishment of his employer, the employee was in-
jured. In reversing the decision of the Appellate Division, the Court
of Appeals, enunciating the law through Justice Lehman, held that
the employee's injury arose out of and in the course of the employ-
ment and was therefore compensible. The critique of this decision
not only affords an elucidation of the law as it is, but also happily
reveals the state of the law as it should be.
The essence of the problem has its common law roots in the mas-
ter and servant relation as laid down in English cases. It is unneces-
sary for the present purpose to search out a case more venerable
than Joel v. Morison,4 decided in 1834 by Baron Parke, in which the
learned jurist established the memorable distinction between a mere
"detour" on the part of a servant engaged upon his master's business
and a "frolic" of the servant. In the latter event, the servant is en-
gaged upon business which is purely his own and relieves the master
of liability for his negligent acts. Joel v. Morison 5 and Sleath v.
Wilson 6 are the leading English cases in the law of master and ser-
vant on mere deviations of the servant; Mitchell v. Crassweller 7 and
Storey v. Ashton 8 are the leading cases on "Frolics" or total aban-
donment of the master's business.
New York cases of significance are Cosgrove v. Ogden,9 in
2 WORKMEN'S CO.MPENSATION LAW, art. 2, §10, Laws of 1922, c. 615.
2262 N. Y. 104, 186 N. E. 409 (1933), rev'g, 236 App. Div. 766, 258 N. Y.
Supp. 1012 (3rd Dept. 1933).
'6 Carr. & P. 501 (1834).
Ibid.
09 Carr. & P. 607.
13 C. B. 237.
sL. R. 4 Q. B. 476.
'49 N. Y. 255, 10 Am. Rep. 361 (1872).
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which the master is held liable for the servant's acts while engaged
upon the master's business despite the servant's performance of the
work in a forbidden manner; Quinn v. Power1 0 holds the master
liable for the servant's negligence while the latter is engaged upon
the master's business; a deviation of the servant, when combining
his own with his master's purpose, does not constitute an abandon-
ment of the master's service is the holding in Jones v. Weigand,"1 and
hence the liability of the master for the servant's negligent acts sur-
vives. The same theory applies in Riley v. Standard Oil Co. of
N. Y.12 But, let the servant abandon the purpose of his master and
embark upon a frolic of his own and we find the master relieved of
liability for the negligent acts of the derelict from duty; it was so
held in Reilly v. Connable 3 and in the Massachusetts case, McCarthy
v. Timmins.
14
With this approach in mind, it may be indicated that the Eng-
lish Workmen's Compensation Act15 is the fount from which the
phrase, "arising out of and in the course of the employment" flowed
to be incorporated in the New York statute. The strict construc-
tion of the phrase in that day as found in Sheldon v. Needham'6
illustrates common law harshness in antithesis to the liberal and be-
nign construction of paternalistic statutes as illuminated by the opin-
ion of Justice Cardozo in Grieb v. Hamrerle.1 7  In the English
case, Lord Justice Eady said:
"I think the law is well established that, if an accident hap-
pens to a person who is being employed in the course of her
employment, the accident may properly be said to arise out
of the employment."
Invoking this logic, the learned Lord Justice denied compensation to
a charwoman who had been sent by her employer to deposit a letter
in a post-box some hundred yards distant from the place of employ-
ment, and who, in carrying out the commission, slipped upon a
banana skin in the street and broke her leg. The court held that the
injury sustained did not arise out of and in the course of employ-
ment.
1087 N. Y. 535, 41 Am. Rep. 392 (1882).
' 134 App. Div. 644, 119 N. Y. Supp. 441 (2d Dept. 1909).
231 N. Y. 301, 132 N. E. 197 (1921), where Justice Andrews said: "No
formula can be stated that will enable us to solve the problem whether at a
particular moment a particular servant is engaged in his master's business. We
recognize that the precise facts before the court will vary the result. We realize
that differences of degree may produce unlike effects. But, whatever the facts,
the answer depends upon a consideration of what the servant was doing, and
why, when, where and how he was doing it."
" 214 N. Y. 586, 108 N. E. 853 (1916).
" 178 Mass. 378, 59 N. E. 1038 (1901).
' 6 Edw. VII, c. 58, §1, subd. 1 (1906).
10 7 B. W. C. C. 471.
1"222 N. Y. 382, 118 N. E. 805 (1918).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The Matter of Grieb v. Hammerle 18 concerns a cigar packer
who, after regular working hours, and while engaged in delivering
cigars at the request of his employer, sustained accidental injury
and died. In affirming the award of compensation, Justice Cardozo
said:
"If the service was incidental to the employer's business and
was rendered at the employer's request, it would be part of
the employment within the meaning of this statute; any other
ruling would discourage helpful loyalty." And further:
"Pro hac %ice, by force of custom or request, the employment
is enlarged." Also: "A service does not cease to be part
of an employment because it is occasional or trivial."
With that inimitable nimbleness of legal wit which characterizes the
learned Justice, he seizes upon the Connecticut cases of Hartz v.
Hartford Faience Co.19 and Larke v. John Hancock M. L. Ins. Co.2 0
to support his theme; and, moreover, illustrates the change in the
English law as given in Sheldon v. Needham,2 1 by quoting from
McDonald v. Owners of the Steamship Banana,22 in which it is said,
obiter dictum, "'If I send my domestic servant in the evening with a
letter to a friend, and he is knocked down by a motor omnibus on
his way to or from my friend's house,' there will be liability under
the English Statute." Justice Cardozo entertains a similar view and
cites Dennis v. White & Co.23 wherein the House of Lords, approv-
ing the dictum, "reviewing all the precedents, and sweeping aside
many fine-spun distinctions, makes it clear that the dictum was sound
and just."
The bridge between the decision in Grieb v. Hammerle and that
in Schwimmer v. Kammerman & Kaminsky is of simple construction
but reveals on close examination a legal lattice-work of most delicate,
intricate and interesting character.
The conclusion is obvious that the courts must give force to the
statutory provision that the employer's liability must flow from the
employee's "disability or death from injury arising out of and in
the course of the employment." 24 This fundamental construction
is upheld by numerous decisions in this jurisdiction and in others
whose statutes read the same.25 Of similar import is the conclu-
"Ibid.
"90 Conn. 539, 97 At]. 1020 (1916).
2090 Conn. 303, 97 Atl. 320 (1916) ; see also Lane v. Lusty, 3 K. B. 230(1915) ; Mann v. Glastonbury Knitting Co., 90 Conn. 116, 96 Atl. 368 (1916).
"Supra note 16.
2 K. B. 926, 929 (1908).
1917 A. C. 479.
' Supra note 2.
Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N. Y. 470, 128 N. E. 711 (1920);
Schultz v. Champion Welding & Mfg. Co., 230 N. Y. 309, 130 N. E. 304(1921); Morris & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 Ill. 49, 128 N. E. 727
(1920).
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sion that the word and carries with it conjunctive force; 26 "arising
out of" and "in the course of the employment" are concurrent con-
ditions and are essential findings to justify an award. The oft-cited
case of Cudahy v. Parramore 27 has limited application in New York
courts because that case deals with a matter arising under the Work-
men's Compensation Law of Utah,28 in which the phrase, "arising
out of or in the course of the employment" occurs; the word or,
naturally carries with it disjunctive force. In New York, both con-
ditional elements must co-exist to justify an award.
The question then presents itself, "What constitutes 'disability
or death from injury arising out of and in the course of the employ-
ment' ?" In answering this query, jurists have been particularly ex-
ercised and vexed by the necessity of interpreting those situations
growing out of the employee's perambulations to or from the place
of employment. 29  The court in Irwin-Neisler & Co. v. Industrial
Commission,3" an Illinois decision, suggests a working definition of
the statutory phrases under discussion and interprets the situations
indicated in terms of legal propositions. "Arising out of," in con-
nection with employment, is construed to refer to the origin or cause
of the accident; "in the course of," in connection with employment,
is construed to refer to the time, place and circumstances of the acci-
dent; an employer may be liable for an employee's injuries sustained
outside the place of employment where the employee's duties take him
away; an employee going to or from the place of employment may or
may not be in the line of employment, and this issue is largely a
question of fact.
The common law finding that the status of master and servant
subsists and persists while the servant is engaged upon the master's
purpose has been previously emphasized. The holdings under the
Workmen's Compensation Law are essentially in agreement with this
principle; but the principle is applied with an elastic yard-stick that
produces widely varying results. The court in Newman v. Newman 31
cites with approval the harsh rule of the early English cases and denies
compensation to the driver of a meat-delivery wagon who was in-
jured while making a delivery on foot. In Gleisner v. Gross &
Heitz v. Ruppert, 218 N. Y. 148, 112 N. E. 750 (1916); McMahon v.
Mack, 220 App. Div. 375, 222 N. Y. Supp. 79 (3rd Dept. 1927); Harris v.
Henry Cheney Hammer Corp., 221 App. Div. 199, 223 N. Y. Supp. 738 (3rd
Dept. 1927).
1263 U. S. 418, 43 Sup. Ct. 94 (1923).
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, §3113; Amended, Laws of Utah, 1919, c. 63.
McNally v. Diamond Mills Paper Co., 178 App. Div. 342, 164 N. Y. Supp.
793 (3rd Dept. 1917); Tillbury v. McCarthy & Townsend, 179 App. Div. 593,
166 N. Y. Supp. 878 (3rd Dept. 1917); Geller v. Republic Novelty Works, 180
App. Div. 762, 168 N. Y. Supp. 263 (3rd Dept. 1917).
"346 Ill. 89, 178 N. E. 357 (1931) ; see also U. S. Fuel Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 310 Ill. 85, 141 N. E. 401 (1923).
1169 App. Div. 745, 155 N. Y. Supp. 665 (3rd Dept. 1915), aff'd, 218 N. Y.
325, 113 N. E. 332 (1916).
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Herbener,3 2 the statute is construed in the light of the factual con-
ditions under two main groups: "if an employee's duties are exclu-
sively or predominantly within an enumerated employment and he is
injured while doing work fairly within the scope of the ordinary
and customary fulfillment of such duties, he has a rightful claim even
though the particular act he was doing when the mishap befell him
would not, of and by itself, ordinarily come within the wording of
the statute"; "if an employee's duties are not exclusively or predomi-
nantly within the category of enumerated employments," and he is
incidentally employed, "the right to remuneration must hinge upon a
finding that he sustained injury while actually and momentarily doing
work named in the statute." That time and well-considered deci-
sions have changed the manner and content of construction will be
presently apparent. The courts have arrived at a broader view of
what is, and what is not, an employee engaged upon his employer's
purpose or business. The artificiality of the earlier English and
American cases with their "fine-spun distinctions" has made way for
a rational realism.
The decision in Schwimmer v. Kammernan & Kaminsky is
logically and properly approached by reviewing the holdings relative
to the various issues of law and fact raised by that case. Decisions
dealing with the conditions incidental to an employee's noon or meal
hour are numerous and diverse in result; these cases are allied to
and influenced by the opinions dealing with an employee's coming to
or from employment in general. Thus, in Harris v. Henry Cheney
Hammer Co.,33 a night watchman, killed at a grade crossing while
going to work, while sustaining injury arising out of employment,
was not in the course of the employment; the claim for compensa-
tion was denied on that ground. A laborer who failed to report on
time to be conveyed to work in a train provided by the employer,
and who walked on the tracks and was killed, was not injured in the
course of the employment. 34 But, where a trolley car conductor,
reporting after regular hours at his place of employment pursuant
to rigid rules, was injured on the way to the office from his home,
it was held that the injury arose out of and in the course of the
employment.35  An employee, en route to a greenhouse where he
had the duty of tending the heating unit, was struck by an automo-
170 App. Div. 37, 155 N. Y. Supp. 946 (3rd Dept. 1915).
Supra note 26.
,Siupra note 26.
' Wilbur v. Fonda, Johnstown & Gloversville R. R. Co., 208 App. Div. 249,
203 N. Y. Supp. 336 (3rd Dept. 1924); see also Lynch v. City of N. Y., 242
N. Y. 115, 151 N. E. 149 (1926); Broderick v. Colon & Co., 255 N. Y. 609,
175 N. E. 334 (1931) ; Pierson v. Interborough R. T. Co., 184 App. Div. 678,
172 N. Y. Supp. 492 (1st Dept. 1918), aff'd, 227 N. Y. 666, 126 N. E. 920
(1920); Kowalek v. N. Y. Consolidated R. R. Co., 229 N. Y. 489, 128 N. E.
888 (1920) ; Tallon v. Interborough R. T. Co., 232 N. Y. 410, 134 N. E. 327(1922) ; Lampert v. Siemons, 235 N. Y. 310, 139 N. E. 278 (1923).
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bile; the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment.36
Of similar tenor are the decisions in MacDonald v. Grand Battery &
Ignition Service,37 Clow v. Keith's Fordham Theatre,3 8 McCarthy v.
Walsh Construction Co.,3 9 Morey v. Allendale School,40 and others.
However, an employee engaged upon his own purpose in return-
ing home, while receiving free transportation on a conveyance sup-
plied by the employer, has no rightful claim if injured, since the
injury does not arise out of nor in the course of the employment; 41
the New York courts seem to lean toward Baron Parke's view that
the employee is engaged upon a frolic of his own. Further, one
who did not leave his place of employment with reasonable despatch,
and was injured there, could not claim that such injury arose out of
and in the course of the employment.42
Among the "lunch hour decisions" occur conflicting and irrecon-
cilable cases. In Mclnerney v. Buffalo & Susquehanna R. R. Co.43
an award was denied to one who left the employer's premises to
go home for dinner and was injured on the way. Similarly, in-juries sustained in the street on the way from the place of employ-
ment to a restaurant do not arise out of nor in the course of tthe
employment.44 In Scanlon v. Herald Co.45 an employee was injured
while returning to work after a meal at home; during the time spent
at home, cognizant of the fact that unfinished duties would be re-
warded with dismissal, he had done some work in the interests of
the employer, but which the latter had not expressly commanded;
it was held that the employee was not in the course of the employ-
ment at the time of the accident.46
Where an employee was injured while sitting in the doorway of
a factory, eating his lunch under circumstances spelling out an in-
vitation to do so on the part of the employer, the injury was held
to arise out of and in the course of the employhnent. 47 An employer
who tacitly assents to the use of a part of his establishment as a
lunch room and provides opportunity for a recreation room is liable
for injuries to an employee sustained during the use of such apart-
Jessup v. Wrigley, 224 App. Div. 800, 230 N. Y. Supp. 854 (3rd Dept.
1928), aff'd, 250 N. Y. 563, 166 N. E. 325 (1929).3 228 App. Div. 869, 242 N. Y. Supp. 838 (3rd Dept. 1930).
-247 N. Y. 583, 161 N. E. 191 (1928).
254 N. Y. 608, 173 N. E. 887 (1930).
' 227 App. Div. 676, 236 N. Y. Supp. 854 (3rd Dept. 1930).
'" Kowalek v. N. Y. Consolidated R. R., supra note 35.
'Adams v. Uvalde Asphalt Paving Co., 205 App. Div. 784, 200 N. Y. Supp.
886 (3rd Dept. 1923).
'3225 N. Y. 130, 121 N. E. 806 (1919).
"Clark v. Voorhees, 231 N. Y. 14, 131 N. E. 553 (1921).
'201 App. Div. 173, 194 N. Y. Supp. 663 (3rd Dept. 1922).
"Ibid. Judge Kiley dissented; and in the light of Grieb v. Hammerle(supra note 17) and Schwimmer v. Kammerman & Kaminsky (supra note 3),
it would appear that the dissenting opinion on that occasion would be the
prevailing opinion today.
Domres v. Syracuse Safe Co., 240 N. Y. 611, 148 N. E. 727 (1925).
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ments. 48  So, also, an employer who permitted employees to warm
bottles of tea in the boiler room in preparation for lunch, although
the particular employee was injured while thus engaged during regu-
lar working hours, is liable for such injuries.4 9 Other cases in point
might be cited in considerable number.
The courts have, in general, been more liberal in granting
awards to "outside workers'"; perhaps an appreciation of the addi-
tional hazards encountered by such employees and a prejudice against
the stuffiness of courtrooms has operated to produce this result.
However, awards have been granted to a helper on a truck who had
not partaken of food for many hours and who, in crossing the street
to purchase cakes at a bakery, was injured; 50 to a chauffeur who
made a detour of seventeen city blocks from his usual route to pro-
cure lunch at home and was injured while traveling; 51 to a chauffeur
who was sent to lunch- by his employer as upon an errand; 52 to a
salesman who was going to have lunch and concurrently interview
prospective customers, and was injured by a fall in the restaurant.53
Awards were denied to a chauffeur who made a detour of one mile
to drive home and tell his wife that he would be home late; 5 and
to an elevated guard who combined the undertakings of free trans-
portation, a visit to his dentist and a visit to the company's office to
collect wages, and was injured while on his way.55
The law concerning traveling salesmen is significant in its bear-
ing on the movements of employees when separated from the estab-
lishment of the employer. Harby v. Marxivell Bros.56 holds that
a traveling salesman may recover an award for injuries sustained
while on the way from his home to take a train for the express pur-
pose of visiting customers of the employer. Indeed, if it can be
shown that the salesman was embarked upon his employer's purpose
in securing customers or trade, even though the element of travel is
colored to some extent by the salesman's personal business, a line of
cases holds that injuries sustained under such circumstances arise
"Donlon v. Kips Bay Brewing & Malting Co., 189 App. Div. 415, 179 N.
Y. Supp. 724 (3rd Dept. 1919).
" Etherton v. Johnstown Knitting Mills Co., 184 App. Div. 820, 172 N. Y.
Supp. 724 (3rd Dept. 1918).
' Sztorc v. James H. Stansbury, 189 App. Div. 388, 179 N. Y. Supp. 586(3rd Dept. 1919).
Baum v. Schweitzer, 124 Misc. 516 (1925).
Bryan v. Bunis, 208 App. Div. 389, 203 N. Y. Supp. 634 (3rd Dept. 1924).
Lavancha v. Kimball & Son, 187 App. Div. 962, 174 N. Y. Supp. 909
(3rd Dept. 1919).
"Perlmutter v. Byrne, 193 App. Div. 769, 182 N. Y. Supp. 945 (3rd Dept.
1920).
'Pierson v. Interborough R. T. Co., 102 Misc. 130, 168 N. Y. Supp. 425
(1917), aff'd, 184 App. Div. 678, 172 N. Y. Supp. 492 (1st Dept. 1919), aff'd,
227 N. Y. 666, 126 N. E. 920 (1920).
"203 App. Div. 525, 196 N. Y. Supp. 729 (3rd Dept. 1922), aff'd, 235 N.
Y. 504, 139 N. E. 711 (1923).
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out of and in the course of the employment.57 However, a traveling
salesman who was overcome by gas at a hotel and died as a conse-
quence had no rightful claim; 5 it would appear that the essence
of salesmanship is motility; when this element is absent, the traveler
is no longer a salesman engaged upon his employer's business.
An attenuated distinction arises in the case of employees in other
fields, however. In Clark v. Voorhees 59 the Court points out that
when an employee (other than a salesman) is injured on the way to
the place where he is to render service, such injury does not arise
out of and in the course of the employment. A subjective rather
than an objective standard, in the Harvard sense, seems to distin-
guish these holdings from the "traveling salesman decisions."
Extraordinary latitude in construing the statutory provision is
evinced by the courts under some circumstances; these liberal awards
are inexplicable on the view that the injuries arose out of and in the
course of the employment except in a remote sense. The theory on
which they rest seems to be that the employer's general purpose is
best served by a paternal attitude to~yard the employed. In Justice
Cardozo's words: "Any other ruling would discourage helpful loy-
alty." 60 Thus, awards may be mentioned for injuries sustained as
a result of seeking shelter from a storm; 61 while answering calls of
nature; 62 while playing ball on an employee's team: 63 while dancing
at a dinner given by the employer; 64 while cranking an automobile
at the employer's residence on a Sunday. 65 It is difficult, if at all
possible, to reconcile these holdings with those in Scanlon v. Herald
Co., 66 Clark v. Voorhees,67 Carroll v. Verway,6 8 and others.
This brings us in proximity to the circumstances and facts en-
countered in Schwimmer v. Kamnerman & Kaminsky. Justice Car-
SHospers v. Hungerford-Smith Co., 194 App. Div. 945, 184 N. Y. Supp.
927 (3rd Dept. 1920), aff'd, 230 N. Y. 616, 130 N. E. 916 (1921); Habbershaw
v. Shepard Co., 197 App. Div. 910, 187 N. Y. Supp. 937 (3rd Dept. 1921) ; Fuld
v. Solomon Co., 197 App. Div. 911, 187 N. Y. Supp. 935 (3rd Dept. 1921);
Goater v. D'Olier, 198 App. Div. 959, 189 N. Y. Supp. 944 (3rd Dept. 1921);
Roberts v. J. F. Newcomb & Co., 201 App. Div. 759, 195 N. Y. Supp. 405(1922).
' Kass v. Hirschberg, Schutz & Co., 191 App. Div. 300, 181 N. Y. Supp. 35
(3rd Dept. 1920).
"g Supra note 44.
' Supra note 17.
'Moore v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 169 App. Div. 177, 154 N. Y. Supp.
620 (3rd Dept. 1915).
Krawczyk v. MacNamara, 187 App. Div. 911, 173 N. Y. Supp. 912 (3rd
Dept. 1919).
Grannis v. Grebe Co., 228 App. Div. 740, 238 N. Y. Supp. 843 (3rd Dept.
1930).
Kenney v. Lord & Taylor, 254 N. Y. 532, 173 N. E. 853 (1930).




254 N. Y. 598, 173 N. E. 882 (930).
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dozo, in Marks v. Gray,6 9 has set forth certain definite principles
affecting the interpretation of an employee's travels to and from the
place of employment. If the work in which the employee is engaged
creates the necessity for transportation or travel, an injury sustained
as a result thereof arises out of and in the course of the employment;
and this is so although the employee is concurrently serving some
purpose of his own. If, on the other hand, the work has no part in
creating the necessity for travel, an injury sustained as a result there-
of does not arise out of and in the course of the employment; the
test seems to be whether the employee is traveling primarily on his
employer's business or is bent upon personal, frolicsome roving.
Incidental employment at the express or implied direction of the
employer may justify an award for injuries sustained while thus en-
gaged. The British Workmen's Compensation Court has so held in
Lowry v. Sheffield Coal Co., Ltd.,70 Molloy v. S. Wales Anthracite
Colliery Co.,71 and Riley v. W. Holland & Sons, Ltd.72 The Ameri-
can courts recognize a wide variety of incidental occupations, and
accidental injuries arising therefrom are held to be compensible.73
The principle involved is broadly expressed in Younger v. Motor
Cab Transp. Co.74 in which the holding was that when some advan-
tage accrues to the employer, no matter how trivial, from the in-
jured employee's conduct, his act is not strictly personal in nature;
total abandonment of the employer's purpose must be shown or else
an injury sustained by the employee may be said to arise out of and
in the course of the employment. So also in a Federal case,75 it
was said that where the deceased was regularly employed, classified
and paid as a longshoreman, compensation should not be denied be-
cause, at the time of his death, he was temporarily performing seryice
not ordinarily performed by longshoremen. But these broad views
are usually tempered by the moderating conditions set forth in a
Connecticut case; 76 "in the course of the employment" embraces the
use of the highway by an employee when doing something with the
employer's knowledge and approval. Concerning knowledge on the
employer's part, it would seem that this knowledge need not be the
result of an express direction, but may arise through circumstances
which would render him chargeable with knowledge; the latter would
constitute a mixed issue of law and fact. It is to be noted that
DeNoyer v. Cavanagh77 holds that a general employer is liable for
-251 N. Y. 90, 167 N. E. 181 (1929).
701 B. W. C. C. 3.
714 B. W. C. C. 65.
-4 B. W. C. C. 155.
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74260 N. Y. 396, 183 N. E. 863 (1933).
Southern Pacific Co. v. Locke, 1 F. Supp. 992 (1932).
'7 Boulanger v. First National Stores, 155 Conn. 665, 163 Atl. 261 (1932).
'221 N. Y. 273, 116 N. E. 992 (1917).
NOTES AND COMMENT
the injuries of an employee, even though at the time of the employ-
ment forming the proximate cause of the injury the employee was
engaged in a special service under the direction of another. In Dale
v. Saunders Bros.78 the rule was restated that payment of wages is
not the sole test of the status of employer and employee.
Arriving at the marrow of this discussion in a manner festina
lente, two important cases require statement. Thus, in Gibson v.
New Crown Market 79 an employee was injured en route from his
home to the market where he was employed, after having taken an
order for meat on the way at the direction of his employer; the di-
rections concerned both the method of travel and the manner of ob-
taining the order; the injury arose out of and in the course of the
employment. This result is to be contrasted with the decision in
Newman v. Newman 8 0 and Scanlon v. Herald Co.
8 1
Bila v. Bloomingdale 8 2 holds that a chauffeur has a rightful
claim to compensation for injuries sustained while engaged upon the
employer's business, subsequent to a deviation from the usual route
of travel undertaken for purely personal reasons on the employee's
part but with the knowledge and consent of the employer. The court
points out that no zone law applies to such cases deciding at what
exact point in space the employee leaves his personal business and
re-enters upon that of the employer. Consent of the employer clearly
relieves the employee of the burden of explaining away his inter-
polated frolic.
In the light of the preceding digest, it becomes obvious that the
opinion in Schwhnmer v. Kammerman & Kaminsky represents a
summation of principles derivable from well-considered cases. The
employee on leaving the factory for his home, as an indoor worker
severing temporal and physical continuity with his general duties, was
engaged upon personal travels. Following his steps toward his abode,
no liability of the employer for possible injuries can be established.
Nor would such liability attach during the employee's domiciliary
visit; his gastronomic feats and other domestic activities that might
strike his fancy would constitute purely personal business. But as
the employee sets forth from his home on the return trip to the fac-
tory, the curtain rises on the first act of a legal drama. He has em-
barked upon a special commission, at the express direction of his
employer. Under the rule of Gibson v. New Crown Market 8 3 that
outside workers, including messengers, are subject to special consid-
eration in the matter of assuming the risks and hazards of the public
highway, the status of the employee has altered significantly. The
special mission on which he has embarked constitutes him a messen-
-s218 N. Y. 59, 112 N. E. 571 (1916).
" 208 App. Div. 267, 203 N. Y. Supp. 355 (3rd Dept. 1924).
' Supra note 31.Si Supra note 45.
184 App. Div. 65, 171 N. Y. Supp. 434 (3rd Dept. 1918).
a Supra note 79.
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ger pro tempore, and the Workmen's Compensation Law, like an in-
visible sprite hovers over him ready to drop an award into his lap
on the slightest provocation. The deviation from his accustomed
route and the purchase of the necessary materials for the repair of
the machine at which he works consummates the liability of the em-
ployer. This liability subsists and persists as the messenger-extra-
ordinary wends his way toward the establishment of his employer.
The rule is derived from Joel v. Morison,8 4 Sleath v. Wilson,85
Quinn v. Power,8 6 Jones v. Weigand,8 7 Riley v. Standard Oil Co. of
N. Y.,81 Grieb v. Hammerle,86 Gibson v. New Crown Market 0 Bila
v. Blooiningdale,91 Irwin-Neisler & Co. v. Industrial Comnission,92
McDonald v. Owners of the Steamship Banana,93 Dennis v. White
& Co., 94 and others.
Under these provocative circumstances fate interposes and pro-
vides an accidental injury for the faithful employee delivering his
purchased materials; should the employer invoke the proposition that
a special, gratuitous occupation exists, the rule of Grieb v. Ham-
merle,95 Younger v. Motor Cab Transp. Co.,96 DeNoyer v. Cav-
anagh,97 and Dale v. Saunders Bros.98 applies. Justice Lehman
makes the point that delivery of the purchased articles was a condi-
tion precedent to the termination of the special mission.
Hence, since the injuries were sustained by the employee before
he arrived at the factory of his employer, they arose out of and in
the course of the employment and as such were compensible. The
decision is sound, just and realistic; it carries with it the force of
substantial compliance with the statute in a practical manner, and the
emphasis of legal principles flowing from a rational, historic source
as found in the well-considered cases under the common law and the
Workmen's Compensation Law.
EMIL F. KocH.
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